There is Cost Growth and There is Cost Growth and the Two Are Not the Same by McNicol, David
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Acquisition Research Program Acquisition Research Symposium
2020-04-27
There is Cost Growth and There is Cost
Growth and the Two Are Not the Same
McNicol, David
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64797
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
I N S T I T U T E  F O R  D E F E N S E  A N A L Y S E S
There is Cost Growth and then there is 




Approved for public release; 
distribution is unlimited.
IDA Document NS D-13164
Log: H 20-000142
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES 
4850 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882
About This Publication
The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing 
the official position of either the Department of Defense or the sponsoring 
organization.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to Gregory A. Davis for performing technical review of this 
document.
For More Information
David L. McNicol, Lead Author
dmcnicol@ida.org, (703) 575-4668
David E. Hunter, Director, CARD
dhunter@ida.org, (703) 575-4686
Copyright Notice
© 2020 Institute for Defense Analyses 
4850 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882 • (703) 845-2000
This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government pursuant to 
the copyright license under the clause at DFARS 252.227-7013 (Feb. 2014).
I N S T I T U T E  F O R  D E F E N S  E  A N A L Y S E S
IDA Document NS D-13164
There is Cost Growth and then there is Cost 







The working title of this briefing initially was: “There is Cost Growth and there is Cost 
Growth and the Two are Not the Same.” This title plays off the widespread, tacit assumption that 
cost growth is a single malady that reflects a common cause or related set of causes. It insinuates, 
to the contrary, that different magnitudes of cost growth have different causes. At a minimum, the 
point was that the causes of very high cost growth differ from the causes of low to moderate cost 
growth. 
It quickly became clear that this assertion largely was an intuition that could not be adequately 
supported with the available evidence or, in fact, anything short of a large study. Consequently, 
the title changed from an assertion to its current form: a question. The briefing finally evolved into 
a one-question, open-book, self-graded, take home examination on the causes of cost growth. The 
exam was first administered (by himself) to the author; it is now offered for others to try. The test 
has no prerequisites and makes no assumptions about how much of the relevant literature the test 
taker has read. In fact, the exam may work better as a test of the conventional wisdom on cost 
growth than it does of statistical analyses and case studies of cost growth. 
The Exam 
The chart on the following page sets the exam question. The cost growth data for 123 Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are grouped into three main categories: 
• Category I: MDAPs with negative cost growth—that is, which, when the acquisition 
was completed, cost less per unit than had been projected at Milestone (MS) B. 
• Category II: MDAPs that had cost growth between zero and 100 percent. This category 
is divided into three sub-categories: 
a. Cost growth of less than 30 percent. 
b. Cost growth between 30 percent and 50 percent. 
c. Cost growth of more than 50 percent but no more than 100 percent. 
• Category III: Cost growth of more than 100 percent. 
The question is: Do we have a theory of cost growth that can, without contortions or ad hoc 




Range of Cost Growth Data 
Note: The data in this figure are for 123 MDAPs that passed Milestone (MS) B during the bust funding climates Fiscal 
Year (FY) 1965–FY1980 and FY 1987–FY 2002. In these climates, competition among MDAPs for funding was 
particularly intense. Programs that passed MS B in boom climates are set aside initially. The measure of cost used 
is Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) in program base year dollars. Cost growth is the ratio of actual PAUC 
observed at the end of the acquisition cycle adjusted to the MS B baseline quantity procured divided by MS B 
PAUC. 
 
2014 Congressional Staff Report1 
In 2014, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs published 
a staff report on acquisition reform, which presented the views of 31 experts. The staff summary 
largely attributed cost growth in MDAPs to the culture of acquisition organizations and misaligned 
incentives. This explanation fails on its face because you cannot explain variation with factors that 
remain constant. 
                                                 
1  Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, Defense Acquisition Reform: Where Do We go From Here?, S. Prt. No. 113-28 (2014) (Staff Report). 
v 
Lorell et al., RAND 20172 
Lorell et al. differs from other sets of case studies in that it is a comparative examination of 
both programs with extremely high (six) and very low (four) cost growth. It finds that extremely 
high cost growth programs each possessed all or most all of five characteristics. These were found 
to be entirely absent in two of the low cost growth programs, and the remaining two programs 
possessed, respectively, one and two of the five factors that cause extremely high cost growth. So, 
to the extent that Lorell et al. is accepted, we know what causes very high cost growth (Category 
III) and we know that those causes are largely absent in lower cost growth programs (Category I 
and the lower end of IIa). 
Lorell et al. has some technical limitations, i.e., a small sample size and that only Air Force 
programs, drawn from a fairly narrow time window, are considered. Laying these aside, and 
recognizing the excellence of the work, its crucial shortcoming is that it does not provide an 
explanation of the full range of cost growth we see in Category II. There are 95 programs in 
Category II—the bulk of the sample used here—and even if all of Category IIa is dropped out, the 
cost growth of the remaining 51 programs ranges from 30 percent to 100 percent. These programs 
are the dandelions of cost growth—not the most noxious of weeds but the most common. 
Conjectures Motivated by Lorell et al. 
No published study has tried to explain the differences in the magnitudes of cost growth 
across Category II programs. In fact, the topic has barely even been noticed.  
The most plausible way forward on this problem is to make a guess about the explanation 
and then, to the extent possible, test it against the data. The three possibilities noted in the briefing 
all concern Errors of Inception, that is, unrealistic elements in the MS B baseline. 
1. One possibility is suggested immediately by what Lorell et al. found—that high cost 
growth programs each had all or most of a particular set of flaws in the MS B program 
or process and that low cost growth systems had few or none. The suggestion is that 
what explains the differences is the number of unrealistic elements in the MS B baseline 
or flaws in the MS B process.  
2. The crucial cause of cost growth variation may be instead the magnitude of the 
unrealistic elements in the MS B baseline—the doses of the poisons, not the number. 
For example, the MS B cost and schedule estimates vary widely in the degree to which 
they proved to be unrealistic. 
3. The extent of cost growth may be determined by toxic combinations of unrealistic MS 
B elements, e.g., immaturity of some critical technologies that appear early on the 
critical path and an unrealistic EMD schedule. 
                                                 
2  Mark Lorell et al., “Program Characteristics That Contribute to Cost Growth,” RR-1761 (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation, 2017). (Referred to hereafter as Lorell et al.) 
vi 
Note that the third of these has a particular implication for how acquisition oversight should be 
framed. The first two point to the importance of review of the particular elements of the program 
proposed as MS B—the cost estimate, schedule, acquisition strategy, and the systems engineering 
plan, among other. In contrast, the third points to the importance of the part of the process—the 
Overarching Integrated Product Team—that looks across elements of the MS B proposal.  
The first of the three hypotheses can be tested easily, albeit crudely, and seems not to be true. 
The other two also could be tested, but doing so would require a great deal of work. 
Did We Pass? 
The author’s grading is as follows: 
• A great deal of effort has gone into Category III over the years. We probably understand 
the causes of extremely high cost growth reasonably well. Grade: 25 points 
• Lorell et al. gives us a start on MDAPs with negative cost growth and it is easy to find 
additional factors involved. Grade: 15 points 
• On Category II programs as a whole, we know one possible explanation that seems not 
to be true; apart from that, we have only conjectures. Grade: 10 points 
This gives us a total 50 points out of 100. We do not pass. 
On a more serious plane, the literature has progressed to the point that deficiencies in 
understanding of Categories I and III largely could be remedied by careful and judicious reading 
and synthesis. The same cannot be said of Category II, which is the largest group and arguably the 
one most relevant to acquisition policy. There appear to be real substantive gaps in our 
understanding of Category II cost growth. 
Concluding Opinion 
The suggestion offered in conclusion rests on two points: 
1. Further frontal assaults on the proximate causes of cost growth are unlikely to gain 
much increased knowledge—they require too much effort and there is no accepted 
framework within which the results of different studies can be accumulated. 
2. Over the past several years a substantial body of evidence has accumulated indicating 
that the root causes of cost growth are imbalances that persist for several years between 
funding and factors like force structure, missions, and equipment age profiles that 
determine the demand for funding. Moreover, it seems likely that highly optimistic MS 
B baselines often receive tacit acceptance by senior DoD officials. 
vii 
Taken together, these two points suggest that the analytical community shift its attention to 
the sorts of issues suggested by a root cause approach:  
• In exactly what ways do the Service’s incentives on MDAPs characteristically differ 
from those of senior OSD leadership? 
• Is the way OSD MS B reviews were structured during the 1970–2017 period efficient 
and effective? What are plausible alternatives? 
• Should we explore ways in which incremental funding could be used safely in certain 
circumstances? 

There is Cost Growth and then there is 
Cost Growth; Do They Have the Same 
Causes?
David L. McNicol
Adjunct Research Staff Member
Institute for Defense Analyses
Presentation to the 17th Annual
Naval Postgraduate School
Acquisition Research Symposium 
May 14, 2020
Original Title
There is Cost Growth and then there is Cost Growth 
and the Two are Not the Same
New Title
There is Cost Growth and then there is Cost 
Growth; Do They Have the Same Causes?
After thrashing on the topic for a few weeks I concluded:
1. I did not have a story that would hold water; and
























These data provide a test for our understanding of the causes of cost growth.
OMG!III
Note: PAUC – Program Acquisition Unit Cost
3
A non-answer – Congressional 
Staff Report from 2014





These cannot by their nature
explain the range of cost 
growth observed. Factors
that remain constant cannot
explain variation.
First Answer – Lorell et al., RAND 2017
 The following features were characteristic of six Air Force 
programs from 1998 to 2002 with extremely high PAUC growth: 
 Immature technology; integration complexity
 Unclear, unstable, or unrealistic requirements
 Problematic contract type or program structure
 Granted Milestone (MS) C authority along with MS B
 Unrealistic cost estimates
 These characteristics were entirely absent in two of four 
programs from the same period with low PAUC growth.  
 This excellent study does not:
 Examine the causes of negative cost growth; or
 Directly tell us anything about the 95 programs in Category II, with 
PAUC growth between zero and 100 percent.
4
Mark Lorell et al., “Program Characteristics That Contribute to Cost Growth” (Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2017).
A Second Try – A Conjecture Based on Lorell et 
al.
 Category II cost growth is governed by the number of poisons 
administered; i.e., the number of unrealistic elements in the MS B 
baseline.
 This is testable and appears not to be the case.
5


















Number of Unrealistic MS B Elements Identified
6
The association of PAUC growth with the number of issues found is small and 
statistically insignificant.
Third Try – A Further Conjecture Based on Lorell
et al.
 It could be that the magnitude of cost growth in Category II varies 
with the magnitude of the doses of poisons administered; e.g., the 
degree to which cost estimates are unrealistic varies widely.  
 Another possibility is that higher cost growth results from particularly 
toxic combinations of unrealistic MS B elements, e.g., immaturity of 
some critical technologies that appear early on the critical path and 
an unrealistic EMD schedule.
 Note that:
 These two have not been tested and doing so would be very 
difficult.

























These data provide a test for our understanding of the causes of cost growth.
OMG!III
Concluding Opinion – How the analytical 
community approaches acquisition policy should 
be rethought
 This opinion rests on two points:
 Studies of proximate causes are expensive to do and are unlikely to 
provide a breakthrough. 
 Acquisition policy and process can usefully be approached via root 
causes.*
 The following sorts of issues arise in a root causes approach:
 In exactly what ways do the Service’s incentives on MDAPs 
characteristically differ from those of senior OSD leadership?
 Is the way OSD MS B reviews were structured from 1970 to 2017 efficient 
and effective? What are plausible alternatives?
 Should we explore ways in which incremental funding could be used 
safely in certain circumstances?
9
* The root causes of cost growth are imbalances that persist for several years between funding and 
factors like force structure, missions, and equipment age profiles that determine the demand for 
funding. Moreover, it seems likely that highly optimistic MS B baselines often receive tacit 
acceptance by senior DoD officials. See D. L. McNicol, Acquisition Policy, Cost Growth, and 




 There was some history associated with the 2014 Staff Report.  
 In 2005, the late Senator John McCain held a hearing concerned with cost 
growth. At the time, he said that he wanted somebody to explain to him the 
causes of cost growth. The three witnesses were John Hamre, President of 
CSIS; IDA’s Gene Porter; and the late Gary Christle of CNA. Reduced to 
quips: Hamre pointed to competition among programs for funding; Porter 
largely blamed unrealistic baselines at MS B; and Christle said that all 
MDAPs experienced cost growth and that the causes were systemic. 
 In 2009, the Congress passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA).  
 In 2014, Sen. McCain was at least one of the main people in the Senate 
calling for the staff report.
 In the National Defense Authorization Acts for FY 2016 and FY 2017, the 
Congress more or less removed OSD from the business of overseeing 
MDAPs after MS A.
11
The Studies Used for Chart 6
 Three published studies provide proximate cause analyses for 
several MDAPs.  In chronological order, these are:
1. Gene H. Porter et al. “The Major Causes of Cost Growth in Defense 
Acquisition, Volume I: Executive Summary.” IDA Paper P-4531. 
Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, December 2009.
2. Richard Diehl et al. “Root Causes of Nunn-McCurdy Breaches—A 
Survey of PARCA Root Causes Analyses, 2010–2011: Interim Report.” 
IDA Paper P-4911. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses, 
August 2012.
3. Mark A. Lorell et al. “Program Characteristics That Contribute to Cost 
Growth.” RR-1761. Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2017.
 Each of these uses PAUC growth computed in program base year 
dollars and adopts a generally similar approach, but they do not use 
the same taxonomy of proximate causes of PAUC growth.
12













I II a II b II c III
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Table 16 from D. L. McNicol, Acquisition Policy, 
IDA Report R-8396, Sept. 2018, p. 38
Coefficients p-value






DSARC -56.7%*** < 0.001
P-C DSARC -50.3%*** 0.001
DAB -59.5%*** < 0.001
AR -80.2%*** < 0.001
***  Statistically significant at less than the 1 percent level.
R-Squared = 0.26, F = 7.02 (P < 0.001), N= 149. Estimated using OLS. Bust2 programs and
the three mid-1980s MDAPs acquired using TPP-like contracts omitted. Wald’s test for the 
equality of the estimated coefficients of the categorical variables for acquisition policy periods
with the Bonferroni correction yields F= 1.43, p = 0.0.946.
Table 3 from D. L. McNicol, Acquisition Policy, 
IDA Report R-8396, Sept. 2018, p. 13
Bust (Fiscal Years) Boom (Fiscal Years)
1965–1980 46% (65) 1981–1986 18% (35)
1987–2002 37% (45) 2003–2009 2% (11)
Total 42% (110) Total 15% (46)
15
Average PAUC Growth for Completed MDAPs that Passed 
MS B in Bust and Boom Climates
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